Western Tanks for Ukraine – How Does this Affect Strategic Balance?

Introduction

The past few weeks from the point of this publication has seen a slew of Western countries pledge a substantial amount of Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in its ongoing fight against the Russian Federation’s invasion of its territory. At least 88 modern tanks have been pledged to Ukraine by the United States, Germany, Poland, Spain, Norway and possibly the Netherlands. Of these countries, the German-made Leopard 2 tank will make up the majority of the pledged assistance – with American M1A2 Abrams and British Challenger 2 tanks making up a combined 35 tanks outside of the primary Leopard 2 contingent.

Ukraine has long requested modern MBT assistance from its Western allies – stating that they are key to not only preventing further Russian territorial gain but also in conducting critical counterstrike operations to break Russian defences and ultimately ‘win’ the conflict. But are these tanks, which are complimented by a plethora of other vehicular and logistical assistance, truly the tide-changing support that Ukraine has so desperately needed to defend its territory? Some claim that these advanced tanks carry an insurmountable logistical burden and are simply a 62-tonne ‘white elephant’ of little use to Ukraine while it struggles to maintain basic supply lines in a WW2-esque war of attrition. However, with the huge jump in capability – facilitated by a Ukrainian state that takes ‘improvise, adapt and overcome’ as its warfighting mantra, Western tanks will prove an indispensable part of Ukraine’s highly dynamic arsenal of tools against Russian aggression.

The Pledged Support

The pledge of American M1A2 Abrams, British Challenger 2 and German-made Leopard 2 tanks have generated much media attention over the past few weeks, with an initially hesitant Germany – influenced by international pressure, removing all barriers to the export of its world-renowned tank as well as exporting 14 of its own. These tanks bring a wide variety of benefits to the Ukrainian armed forces, who are set to receive tanks in ‘Company’ size formations (14) from its allies. But why did Ukraine ask for such specific capability when it already has Soviet-produced tanks of similar quality to Russian forces? The answer is simple – Overmatch doctrine, to vastly outclass an opponent.

Modern MBTs bring a host of new capabilities to a now overstretched Ukranian military. Aside from the traditional combat capabilities of these tanks being greater than the now aged capabilities of Russian T-72Bs and T-90s, the main benefit of these tanks is their much improved sensor and Fire Control System (FCS) technology. In particular, these Western MBTs host a wide variety of night (NVG) and infrared/thermal (IRT) camera improvements over current stocks of Ukrainian and Russian tanks. The ability for these tanks to fight largely unimpeded during night time or in other challenging conditions such as difficult weather makes them far more capable than the Russian tanks they will be pitted against. While the exact capabilities of these fire control systems and sensors remain a secret, it’s safe to assume that the thermal imaging capability of these tanks exceeds the range of their weapons, which can fire up to 4,000 meters or 2.5 miles. Aside from the most modern of Russian tanks, this is not a capability that most Russian tank stock has the luxury of having – with night vision alone being a rarity amongst older T-72B tanks which make up the majority of the invasion force. Ignoring the advances in Western ammunition and gun accuracy, these sensors alone provide a critical asset for Ukrainian forces – situational awareness.

Alongside improvements in sensor technology, these Western tanks bring increased speed, mobility, accuracy and even crew protection over Russian stock. While the increased weight of these tanks may yield some issues in crossing the most challenging of terrain, especially non-reinforced bridges, their improved fire control capabilities should more than make up for it in the steppes of Ukraine, where improved sensors, cameras, accuracy and range will prove a highly effective offensive cocktail for Ukrainians to leverage in combat. Provided Ukraine can receive enough ammunition and fuel to maintain combat effectiveness, these Western tanks should prove to be highly valuable in a conflict where both speed and accuracy define tactical success. Thus, it is no secret why Ukraine has long sought modern MBTs from the West to achieve victory. To obtain Western MBTs is to achieve ‘overmatch’ against its opponent, especially in the field of fire control and mobility.

The White Elephant Argument

So in the face of these improved capabilities over Russian tanks, why is it that some commentators suggest that these tanks are nothing more than a ‘white elephant’ for Ukraine’s military? The answer lies in two primary issues, training and logistical support. Training crews on a tank with far more technical complexity over the T-72s familiar to Ukrainians is by no means an easy feat, especially in a time constrained environment where traditional training available to American or European troops may be cut by as much as half. Additionally, the added mechanical complexity of these modern tanks may prove to challenge the support network required to operate these machines. With mechanical expertise and supplies available in Ukraine largely focused on maintaining Soviet-produced stock, replacement parts, materials and even knowledge may be constrained without enhanced logistical support from the West.

In spite of these issues, however, is Ukraine’s almost remarkable adaptability in its systems utilisation. Western tanks are by no means the first technologically advanced asset exported with quick turnaround to Ukrainian forces – With American HIMARS and M270 Multiple Rocket Launch Systems being used with staggering effect on Russian targets. These same crews were provided with far less training afforded to traditional crews and yet still thrived in a highly dynamic and tactically challenging environment. These same Ukrainian crews have also employed the French CAESAR artillery system, VAB armoured vehicle and even the British FV103 Spartan armoured personnel carrier in combat operations in spite of reduced training. While the training required to operate an Abrams, Leopard or Challenger is no-doubt far more taxing, with an emphasis on creating effective ‘crew synergy’ the most critical part – There is little evidence to suggest that Ukrainian crews are struggling to adapt to other Western vehicles in spite of reduced training. Additionally, it is important to consider that it’s far easier to take experienced tank crewmen with tactical experience and adapt them to a new, but ultimately similarly employed asset than it is to train ‘fresh’ crewmen on not only how to operate a tank, but also how to conduct tactical operations. So long as Ukraine provides already experienced tank crewmen to be trained on these systems, the effect of reduced training times should be largely attenuated.

The issue of logistics is one of greater issue to the Ukrainians. It is no secret that these Western MBTs will challenge Soviet-centric supply lines and technical expertise, with the Abrams and its rudimentary gas turbine engine of particular logistical challenge. However, these modern tanks have been designed with some logistical insufficiency in mind – with the Abrams consisting of a highly modular system of Line-Replaceable Units (LRUs), easily replaceable parts that make up the bulk of its primary systems. It is relatively safe to assume that the Leopard and Challenger 2 have also employed LRUs for systems where possible, making it far easier to isolate and replace faulty components with little training. Tank crews are typically trained on the maintenance and field replacement of these LRUs and so long as each country is willing to supply an excess of critical items that make up the bulk of systems on board these tanks, Ukrainians should be able to largely overcome the increased mechanical burden of deploying Western MBTs. Outside of general maintenance on these tanks, the issue of fuel consumption and ammunition will remain a primary consideration in how or even if Ukraine will be willing to leverage these tanks to their fullest extent. The logistical environment in Ukraine is challenging, with existing roads and train tracks a frequent target of Russian attack. Getting fuel and ammunition to the frontline to supply these logistically demanding tanks will be key to success, albeit very challenging. Improving Ukraine’s capability to provide logistics to its frontlines through the provision of trucks and even armoured vehicles is ultimately key to supporting the utilisation of these tanks and the maintenance of the war effort overall. Thus, it is important that Western nations continue to provide these much needed non-combat logistics vehicles to Ukraine in-tandem with tanks and other combat vehicles. Provided this is fulfilled and Ukrainian commander awareness on the importance of establishing logistics lines is maintained, western tanks can be operated to their fullest extent of their abilities.

Utilising Western Tanks in Ukraine

After obtaining the ‘green-light’ to obtain tanks, Ukraine must now consider how it can actually utilise these high value assets in a challenging tactical theatre. While Ukraine is being supplied these tanks in company size formations (14 tanks per company), we find it unlikely that Ukraine will operate these tanks in this format. Rather, to support the large frontline of operations, Ukraine will likely split these tanks at the platoon level (3-4 tanks) and have them conduct operations in support of other tank companies utilising older Soviet armoured vehicles. This will be to maximise the effect of improved sensor capability, using the more modern Western tanks to hunt for targets and coordinate with existing Ukrainian armoured stock to achieve tactical success. Using these Western tanks for what they are, a vehicle with far greater lethality and importantly, situational awareness, will allow Ukraine to better coordinate its overall armoured capability. This would be far more effective than keeping these tanks in much larger company formations, where coordination with other non-Western armoured vehicles is less frequent. Thus, operating tanks at the platoon level not only introduces greater individual lethality from mere presence, but also much broader improved tactical capability – leveraging the improved sensor suite on modern vehicles to support less advanced, but more plentiful Soviet-produced tanks.

While the export versions of these tanks are arguably some years behind current variants, with the American M1A2 Abrams forgoing the addition of its highly classified uranium ‘Chobham’ armour, these tanks will still host a capability much above that of the T-72s and T-90s they will face. The issue for these tanks, however, is their survivability against Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) of which Russia frequently utilises. These missiles have a particularly potent effect against even modern tanks and Ukraine must make very careful use of their new assets in the face of this threat. Thus, the suggestion of using these Western tanks as mobile fire support and command platforms coordinating with a much broader armoured fighting force may allow Ukraine to keep these tanks away from unnecessary danger. That being said, for a tank to be tactically relevant it must remain at the frontline, where ATGM threats also exist. These tanks are by no means invincible and Ukraine must use them sparingly in its current theatre of operations to ensure that unnecessary losses are averted, instead using the enhanced sensors on these MBTs as well as the American Bradley M2A2 ODS armoured vehicles to conduct reconnaissance and accurate target finding for artillery support. With limited resources available, Ukraine must make full and effective use of combined arms doctrine, using these high value assets sparingly to coordinate with artillery and other support to remove threats to tank operations and achieve operational success.

Provided Ukraine can utilise these new tanks sparingly as not only a highly mobile and lethal platform, but also as an enhanced situational awareness platform, it can achieve success with an otherwise limited supply of tanks and support. Rather than modern tanks alone being the sole contributor to future operational success, it is instead the case that modern tanks are simply another highly capable asset that can allow for the much better implementation of combined arms doctrine, from infantry operations to artillery support.

Conclusion - Will Western Tanks Win This War?

Western MBTs will be a hugely important asset available to Ukrainian forces, especially in the coming months when winter subsides and mobile combat returns. The vastly improved mobility, lethality and situational awareness of these vehicles will no doubt vastly diminish the threat of Russian adversary tank operations, with the capabilities of these modern tanks greatly exceeding that of their Russian counterparts. However, the war in Ukraine will not be won through simple tank-on-tank warfare, and merely considering the increased lethality of these new Western tanks against Russian vehicles does little to fully encapsulate their tactical importance.

Instead, Western tanks are simply one large piece in a much larger combined arms machine, where situational awareness and the ability for Ukrainian troops to quickly and accurately coordinate support from infantry and artillery will be a far more critical factor in facilitating Ukraine’s victory against Russian aggression. Thus, the slightly unconventional use of Western tanks as almost ‘reconnaissance’ vehicles to support much broader operations will be the primary benefit afforded to Ukrainian commanders from the use of Western tanks. This is combined with the West’s continued support in improving Ukraine’s fire support capability through HIMARS, M270 Rocket launchers, howitzers and Self Propelled Guns (SPGs) – which were all key players in Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive of late-2022. Thus, in addition to tanks, the Western world must support all elements of Ukraine’s combined arms doctrine – continuing the export of highly capable artillery systems and training to Ukrainian crews. Through the maintenance of this combined arms capability, with tanks becoming a large element of this doctrine, Ukraine can achieve operational victory.