Russo-DPRK Summit - What are the Implications for the International Community?

Introduction

Vladimir Putin is currently hosting North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in a rare state visit to Russia, Kim Jong-Un’s first since 2019. Notably, the summit was conducted at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur Oblast, a key site for Russia’s space exploration program and future replacement for the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Both leaders have much to gain and, more importantly, little to lose from economic and materials cooperation between the two countries. Russia desperately needs to bolster its conventional military ordinance supply to support its ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine – something that North Korea can supply in plentiful amount. Similarly, North Korea has much to gain from Russia in the form of staple foods, petroleum products and importantly, technical expertise for its ballistic missile program. From both countries mutually supplying these crucial items to the other, a much stronger relationship may be born from this summit with a plethora of geo-strategic implications for East-Asia, Europe and beyond.

A strengthened Russo-DPRK relationship may allow Russia to increase, if only acutely, its use of conventional military ordinance to curtail recent momentum gathered by Ukraine in its counteroffensive. For Russia, it need only obtain enough ordinance to push Ukraine back until winter where it can begin strengthening its defensive position within Ukrainian territory. For North Korea, the benefits it seeks to gain may have far greater implications to regional and international stability. Improving its ballistic missile development while downsizing its less productive conventional military force may allow it to continue its nuclear brinkmanship with greater capability at the international community’s expense. Thus, the geo-strategic effects of this Russo-DPRK summit may be far greater than initially predicted, with many news outlets failing to properly envision what North Korea also stands to gain from increased cooperation.

A Relationship of Mutual needs – why are Russia and North Korea Cooperating?

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukrainian territory has pushed its logistical capacity to the absolute limit. Russo-Soviet warfare doctrine relies heavily on achieving overwhelming fire superiority, something that it continues to leverage in Ukraine with artillery shell usage assumed to average 20,000 rounds a day (Source - NBC News) a stark contrast to Ukraine’s daily shell usage quota of 5,000. To maintain the doctrine it is most comfortable with, Russia must find a way to secure alternate sources of much needed artillery ammunition, with a secondary requirement of tank ammunition. North Korea is able to supply just that, with huge supplies of standardised Soviet calibre munitions ready to be sent for suitable compensation. Russia’s reliance on conventional artillery is becoming more pertinent with the prospect of Ukrainian forces moving closer to Russian positions and importantly, in closer range to its self-propelled and towed artillery pieces. Ukraine may have a technological advantage in the form of advanced self-propelled artillery, rocket systems and modern armoured vehicles, however it will struggle to make sustainable progress if Russia is able to keep its artillery platforms stocked with ammunition.

Additionally, to meet Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu’s target of increasing artillery shell production by “(a factor of) 7 to 8” (Source - Rossiyskaya Gazeta [STATE OWNED]) it is likely that companies such as Uralvagonzavod, Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant and JSC Instrument Design Bureau will have to increase their output by instituting longer working days and switching capacity away from less desirable products to fulfil its primary quota – artillery shell production. To meet such huge increases in production, it is not impossible to assume that the production of other items such as tank ammunition, which these companies also produce, may be slowed or even halted to meet the demand for artillery shells. This, however, does not mean that tank ammunition is not required by units operating in Ukraine. One option available to Russia would be to secure existing stockpiles of tank ammunition from North Korea to allow its own defence companies to focus production on higher-grade artillery shells – especially the precision guided ‘Krasnopol-M2’. Thus, North Korea can supply Russia with regular, average-grade stockpiles of tank and artillery ammunition - allowing Russian ordnance production companies to focus on more demanding precision-grade artillery ordnance and specialised tank round production.

In comparison to Russia, North Korea stands to gain much more from increased cooperation. Large scale importation of staple foods and fossil fuels will grant a much-needed boost to the Kim regime’s survivability in the face of faltering energy security and near-famine levels of food scarcity. In addition to imports of basic food and fuels, North Korea also stands to benefit from a few more specialised imports from the Russian Federation – such as technical expertise and, importantly, materials relevant to its ballistic missile program.

2 years of absolute isolation from the outside world during the pandemic, adverse weather throughout the year and an almost complete cessation to many forms humanitarian aid beginning from 2021 (Source - World Food Programme) has placed the already fragile North in an even more perilous food security situation. Regardless of the Kim regime’s treatment of its own people, it needs to at least meet basic food supply requirements to ensure regime survival. Russia, especially after a huge reduction in its trading partners, can easily bolster North Korea’s wheat and grain supply. In addition to staple foods, North Korea has historically struggled to secure petroleum products for both its military and agricultural sector. For the North, even the procurement of diesel and other basic petroleum products can be prohibitively difficult – leading to a weakened military stance and lessened agricultural capacity. Russia, being a huge exporter of petroleum-based fossil fuels will be more than able to supply the North with its required fuels in exchange for its military stockpiles. For North Korea, securing a stable supply of basic fuels, especially in the coming winter, will almost certainly help maintain food and energy security within its own borders.

In addition to basic food and fuel imports, North Korea will be very interested in what Russia has to offer in support of their ballistic missile program. Russia has long boasted a successful ballistic missile/space-capable rocket capacity and, to North Korea, has very desirable technological expertise and abundant materials ready for export. North Korea has long attempted to improve its solid-fuel missile technology, of which Russia has plentiful experience from its Iskander and Topol missile platforms. Additionally, Russia will have plentiful stockpiles of specialised UDMH/НДМГ fuel for North Korea’s nuclear-capable Hwaseong-7 ballistic missiles. These imports of specialised fuels and relevant technologies may have the capacity to not only bolster support for North Korea’s existing ballistic missile stocks, but also allow for more capable innovation in its future missile projects. Lastly, Russia has long held the technology to miniaturise nuclear warheads – something that North Korea continually attempts to achieve to enable the development of nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of striking targets as far as the continental US. Thus, increased specialised fuel and technology export to North Korea will almost certainly allow it to aggressively posture its ballistic missile forces with greater confidence to achieve regime security through nuclear brinkmanship, a development of huge expense to regional stability and the wider international community.

What Will be Traded?

The DPRK has much to offer a logistically challenged Russia. As stated above, Russia will be most interested in the DPRK’s vast stockpiles of artillery and tank ammunition. As the DPRK is willing to offload its less useful ordinance in favour of support for its more viable weapons platforms, Syriacus Consulting believes the following ordinance is most likely to be given to Russia in large amounts. The below predictions are based on Russian classifications and naming conventions. Due to a lack of information on North Korean ammunition stockpiles, the ammunition in the DPRK’s possession may differ slightly in design or name; however the function remains exactly the same. Much of the following information has been obtained from the IISS' 'Military Balance 2021' and the US Army TRADOC Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).


152MM artillery ammunition for Russia’s Self-Propelled (SP) and towed artillery systems. Platforms such as the 2S3 ‘Akatsiya’, 2S5 ‘Giatsint-S’ and 2S19 ‘Msta’ SP guns can use this ammunition to great effect. It is expected that North Korea has the following ordnance, or nearest equivalent, ready for export in large amounts to Russia.

OF-45 High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
OF-530(A) High-Explosive (HE)
BR-540(A) Armor-Piercing High-Explosive (APHE)
BP-540 High-Explosive Anti-Tank with Tracer (HEAT-T)


122MM artillery ammunition may also be available for export to Russia. These 122mm shells can easily be used in Russia’s 2S1 ‘Gvozdika’ self-propelled howitzer and D-30 towed howitzer.

OF-462 High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
3OF56 High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
OF572 High-Explosive (HE)
D4 White Phosphorous Smoke (WP)


115MM tank ammunition for Russia’s T-62 variants. This will be sourced from North Korea’s Chonma-Ho I through VI tanks as well as the Pokpung-ho 215.

3VBM1 Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS)
OF11/OF18 High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
BK-4 High-Explosive Anti-Tank Fin Stabilised with Tracer (HEAT-FS-T)


125MM tank ammunition for Russia’s T-64, T-72, T-80 and T-90 may also be provided from North Korea’s stocks of its own T-72s, M-2002 Pokpung-ho 216 and M2020.

3OF19 High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
3VBK7 High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT)
3VBM3-M15 Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding-Sabot with Tracer (APFSDS-T)


Rocket artillery ammunition may also be supplied to Russia in comparatively limited amounts. Compared to 122 and 152MM artillery ammunition, rocket artillery is more strategically relevant to North Korea. Therefore, support in the form of rocket artillery supplies may be more limited in scope to 122MM rockets for the BM-21 ‘Grad’ MLRS platform.

9M22U High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)
9M28F High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-Frag)


For items available for export to North Korea, Syriacus Consulting believes that, in spite of sanctions, the following resources may be included in a trade deal.

Basic Crude Oil Products, petrol, diesel, aviation and maritime fuel.
Advanced fuel products, such as solid fuel mixtures and UDMH/НДМГ liquid fuel for North Korea’s ballistic missiles.
Grain products, namely wheat.
Processed food products.
Advanced metal-alloy products for use in ordnance production, namely ballistic missiles.
Technical support for propulsion, guidance and other ballistic missile systems. This may be in the form of designs, materials support or even human expertise export.

Russo-DPRK Cooperation – Impacts to Geopolitical Stability

Many commentators have analysed the potential effects of Russia obtaining support from North Korea on the current war in Ukraine. During the current counteroffensive, Russia will be relying on its artillery and howitzer systems more than ever to repel Ukrainian forces and prevent them from breaking through Russian defensive lines. Syriacus Consulting estimates that any amount of support from North Korea is only intended to fulfil a very acute, short-term requirement. We estimate that Russia is attempting to quickly obtain basic artillery and tank ammunition to ensure that it remains well-stocked until winter, where movement will slow and the threat of a counteroffensive will fade. Russia will be well aware that North Korea is not in a position to willingly exhaust its own supplies of ammunition, especially since it will struggle to mass-produce what it traded with Russia. Thus, any export of DPRK ordnance is likely to be very short term and simply to fulfil the current requirements of commanders on the frontline as well as allowing Russian ordnance manufacturers to continue their focus on producing in-demand advanced systems, weapons and ammunition.

Syriacus Consulting does not believe that Russia will gain a substantive advantage in the war from this deal – instead, Russia is simply trying to avoid the very real risk of logistical collapse. Whether or not maintaining healthy artillery and tank ammunition stocks will slow the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is yet to be seen and it will be difficult to assess whether increased usage of artillery ammunition will have any effect outside of preventing Ukraine from making quick territorial gains. In comparison, North Korea stands to gain much more from Russia’s exports. For the Kim regime, maintaining some level of stability through the provision of basic oil products and food, of which Russia has a huge surplus, has always been a priority for regime survival. Obtaining much needed food and oil products will grant stability to an otherwise very vulnerable post-COVID North Korea. Due to current sanctions, Russia will be willing to export to North Korea what it can no longer export to the rest of the world - something of huge benefit to North Korea and little loss to Russia.

In addition to basic fuel and food products, North Korea stands to gain from Russia’s huge surplus of advanced fuel and metal products as well as technical expertise from over 7 decades of ballistic missile development. Notably, having greater access to much needed advanced liquid fuels, such as UDMH/НДМГ will alleviate a long-running barrier to North Korean ballistic missile testing, development and posturing – fuel supply. Additionally, by receiving further support with Russian solid fuels, there is a potential that DPRK ballistic missile capability can improve vastly with increased solid fuel system integration. The increased supply of advanced Russian fuel products for its ballistic missile program may facilitate a marked increase in North Korean missile testing and posturing at the expense of North Korea’s regional neighbours – particularly Japan.

In regards to ballistic missile support, North Korea may also be able to benefit from Russia’s technical and metallurgic expertise in its future ballistic missile designs. Russia benefits from large supplies of critical metals such as aluminium and titanium, as well as hosting a large and capable metal production industry. In comparison to North Korea’s domestic metal production capacity, Russia can easily supply high grade steel, aluminium and titanium alloys to North Korea for a multitude of applications. Notably, however, is the value of high-grade metals for ballistic missile production, something that may improve North Korea’s ballistic missile production and improvement capacity. Lastly, and most worrying, is the prospect of Russia giving North Korea increased technical support regarding its missiles and WMD miniaturisation efforts. One of the few roadblocks remaining in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is the reliable miniaturisation of large yield nuclear warheads capable of re-entry, something that most states have not yet assessed North Korea to have achieved. On the other hand, Russia is highly experienced in this field and may be able to lend substantial amounts of help to the DPRK in the form of technical designs, plans and even human expertise export. This form of support may substantially improve the capability of North Korea’s strategic nuclear forces, allowing for never-before-seen levels of severity behind North Korea’s nuclear threats. This can easily disrupt the regional strategic balance in Northeast Asia as well as attract the attention of the United States, who will be increasingly concerned about North Korea’s capability to strike the continental United States with a miniaturised nuclear warhead.

Of interest, however, is the notion that cooperation with Russia may actually reduce North Korea’s belligerence for as long as it can reliably source large amounts of food and fuel. Syriacus Consulting has assessed that much of the past two-decades of North Korean military, political and nuclear belligerence has been attributed to domestic factors within the DPRK, namely famine, fuel shortages and the 2011 succession difficulties facing Kim Jong Un following the death of his father. North Korea has demonstrated that its belligerence is lucrative, often receiving food and fuel support from anxious nations in exchange for a cessation in belligerence. While North Korea may now have increased ballistic missile launch capacity from its newly received fuel imports, as well as a potentially increased capacity for improvement, there is no guarantee that the DPRK will immediately use this to increase regional anxieties with further missile launches. Instead, there is a potentiality that obtaining a reliable source of food and fuel will decrease the lucrativeness of belligerence, helping create the conditions for a comparatively dormant North Korean foreign policy.

Conclusion

Regardless of the suggestion that North Korea might reduce its belligerent activity following the receipt of food and fuel, there remains an incredibly worrying prospect of a far more capable North Korea following the Russo-DPRK summit. While North Korea may be reducing some of its conventional capabilities by exporting its ordnance to Russia, it may gain tenfold what it has lost in its capacity by receiving much needed advanced fuels for its ballistic missiles as well as potential technical support for improved missile and nuclear warhead technology. To the United States, what North Korea may gain from this deal is of far greater importance compared to any acute benefit Russia achieves. What might follow is increased pressure on North Korea from the international community should it reliably suggest it has miniaturised a nuclear warhead capable of striking the continental US. What might follow after could be a very, very dangerous North Korea reminiscent of its 2010 self, where it sank the ROKS Cheonan, killing 46 and later shelled Yeongpyeong Island, killing 4. There is a potential that an increasingly nuclear capable North Korea, which is a likely product from its deal with Russia, may vastly increase the chances of the Korean peninsula becoming a flashpoint for a major conflict.

Thus, while Russia stands to gain something from this summit – receiving plentiful stocks of artillery and tank ammunition in an attempt to prolong its illegal war of aggression in Ukraine; it is North Korea who actually stands to benefit the most. North Korea will be able to obtain its much-needed basic fuels and food, helping the Kim regime cement its grip over its people, while also receiving additional specialist resources that it will no doubt employ in its ballistic missile program. North Korea will continue to replace its conventional military might with a plethora of ballistic missiles, some WMD-capable, to leverage what it wants from the international community. The ramifications of this summit on international security are thus far beyond what might be initially expected – with North Korea and Russia obtaining what they so desperately need and, most importantly, losing very little in the process. Rather, it is the rest of the international community that suffers from a prolonged war in Ukraine and an increasingly nuclear capable North Korea.